

VAN GOSSE

### 3 Unpacking the Vietnam Syndrome

#### *The Coup in Chile and the Rise of Popular Anti-Interventionism*

BESIDES SUFFERING military defeat by a "fourth-rate power," in Henry Kissinger's words, the long-term impact of the Vietnam War at home was that, from 1967 on, major institutions of civil society, including professional and academic associations and leading religious denominations, linked their antiwar demands to those of radicals. Suddenly, opposition to U.S. foreign policy became pervasive instead of marginal—a part of life in major urban centers. In this context, the ambitious and the brilliant were drawn in through the mixture of high purpose and opportunism that distinguishes crises like wars and revolutions. Bill Clinton's trajectory from helping organize the 1969 Moratorium to serving as Texas director of the 1972 McGovern campaign demonstrates the attraction of the antiwar side in a polarized United States, even for those seeking power within the mainstream. The failure of U.S. political-military strategy in Southeast Asia, and the ensuing systemic crisis, produced a free fall where the mainstream had no consensus, legitimating sharp public disagreements unknown since the debates over entry into World War II before Pearl Harbor.

Out of this ferment emerged a new political coalition opposed to the Cold War's basic premises: containment of revolutionary nationalism in the Third World; covert action as a principal policy instrument; support for reactionary (usually military) dictatorships as bulwarks against the "two, three, many Vietnams" across Africa, Asia, and Latin America prophesied by Ernesto Che Guevara. This coalition represented the successful fusion of the antiwar movement and the heterogeneous New Left with the post-1968 radicalization of Democratic Party liberalism.

The Vietnam War was the starting point, rather than the culmination, of effective anti-interventionist politics in the Cold War era, and the consolidation of a radical-liberal bloc against the Cold War consensus came at the war's end, after U.S. troops withdrew from Indochina in

early 1973. Congressional and grassroots activism against U.S. backing of military dictatorships in places like Greece, Brazil, and Guatemala had grown from 1968 on, as demonstrated by a series of legislative hearings, the first restrictions on U.S. aid to governments that abused human rights, and the formation of small activist groups like the American Friends of Brazil and the American Friends of Guatemala. International outrage focused especially on Brazil in the early 1970s, with a Bertrand Russell Tribunal in Rome in July 1973. All of this was a prelude, however, to protest against the Nixon administration's role in the September 11, 1973, coup that toppled Chile's elected Marxist government, which kept growing in the months after the coup because of the brutality of the junta led by General Augusto Pinochet. Activism around Chile played a central role in cohering the new anti-interventionist coalition from 1974 to 1976. From then on, during the late 1970s and the 1980s, until the end of the Cold War between 1989 and 1991 and military triumph in the 1991 Gulf War, it placed real limits upon the "national security state" by redefining the relationship between the public, Congress, and the Executive. In sum, *this* was the Vietnam syndrome: not just an unarticulated public malaise and a gun-shy senior-officer corps, but the establishment of a well-grounded foreign policy opposition.

Historians have documented that the premises of Cold War diplomacy came under attack after 1965 because of a mushrooming antiwar movement with a Capitol Hill lobby led by liberal churches and traditional peace groups, and political scientists have noted the significance of the Chilean coup to the development of a new, post-Vietnam foreign policy ethic.<sup>1</sup> In 1981, Lars Schoultz examined how by 1977 "the combined interest groups concerned with the repression of human rights in Latin America had become one of the largest, most active, and most visible foreign policy lobbying forces in Washington" and that "Chile became the focus of the human rights movement in the United States."<sup>2</sup> Later, Paul Sigmond assessed the long-term effects of revelations about CIA activities, outlining how a series of sensational congressional hearings coinciding with the Watergate crisis ratcheted up pressure to assert congressional control over foreign policy. This process began in March 1973, before the coup, when Idaho senator Frank Church exposed the International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) company's attempts to use the CIA to block the Socialist Salvador Allende's 1970 ascension to Chile's presidency. It extended through 1976, when Congress cut off all military and most economic aid to the Pinochet junta—at that time, an

unprecedented step. In between came the 1975 hearings on intelligence activities by Senate and House committees (headed, respectively, by Church and Representative Otis Pike) that were the worst humiliation ever suffered by the Cold War elite, worse even than that spring's final collapse of "South" Vietnam. The Church and Pike Committee hearings ruined the careers of two directors of Central Intelligence and exposed decades of routine CIA political corruption, destabilization, and assassination in the Third World. As Sigmund reminds us, the lever that forced this grand show-trial was outrage over revelations of U.S. complicity in the destruction of Chilean democracy.

But there is an ellipsis, a gap, in these studies. Why? Why the Church Committee? Why the intense focus on state terror in Chile, when repression, torture, and murder had been the norm in Latin America since the U.S.-backed coup in Brazil in 1964? Certainly Chile's Socialist president Dr. Salvador Allende was a compelling figure, and his Popular Unity government's experiment in "socialism with freedom" by a coalition of Socialists, Communists, and radical Christians engaged global sympathy. But asserting major public and congressional outrage without explaining the sources of that protest begs the question of causality. Sigmund essentially ignores the anti-intervention mobilizations "in solidarity" with Chile.<sup>3</sup> Schoultz takes the organized opposition seriously but limits his investigation to Capitol Hill, alluding only briefly to diverse constituencies outside Washington that were the ground troops for human rights lobbyists like the Washington Office on Latin America and the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy. His account of how "humanitarian values" intersected with "bureaucratic politics" points us in the right direction, however, by listing the factors that changed U.S. policy after 1973, a sequence from Vietnam through Watergate to "the 1973 coup in the nation that had been the pride of Latin American democracy."<sup>4</sup>

My goal in this essay is to reconsider the role of dissent so as to show how organized activism is sometimes central to the making of foreign policy. The congressional heroes of the "human rights years" in the mid-1970s, Senator Edward Kennedy and Representatives Donald Fraser, Michael Harrington, and Tom Harkin, and the groups that collaborated with them to write vital new legislation responded to specific circumstances, including three distinct sectors with their own institutional bases: first, intellectuals organized by their profession or discipline, including professors, doctors, and lawyers; second, the self-identified

Left (both New and Old); finally, the vast web of Christian denominations, with the United States Catholic Conference (USCC) as a leading voice.

The intelligentsia was quickest off the mark in responding to the coup. In the first months after September 11, 1973, professors and doctors played the leading role. Without a chorus of respectable but impassioned voices that labeled the new junta as beyond the pale, Chile might never have become a celebrated human rights cause. At first, even liberal opinion was hardly unanimous. In the coup's immediate aftermath, the *New York Times* gave repeated excuses for the junta, which had bombed and then militarily assaulted Chile's presidential palace, the Moneda. On September 12, 1973, the day after a democratically elected president had died gun in hand, it editorialized that "a heavy share [of blame] must be assigned to the unfortunate Dr. Allende" because "he persisted in pushing a program of pervasive socialism for which he had no popular mandate." On September 20, four days after publishing an Amnesty International report that thousands of leftists had been summarily shot, the *Times* asserted "it was inevitable that lurid rumors of mass executions would circulate" and "it was incorrect to refer to what had happened there as a fascist coup" because "there is no reason to doubt that the military leaders moved against Dr. Allende with great reluctance, and only because they genuinely feared a polarized Chile was headed for civil war."

In this context, the prompt reaction of academics and other professionals made a real difference. The first national protests against the coup were led by professors. On Sunday, September 23, the Chile Emergency Committee placed a full-page ad in the *New York Times* under the headline "Santiago: the Streets Are Red with Blood." Besides denouncing the "reign of terror" in Chile, it detailed the U.S. destabilization of Allende, with numerous quotations from ITT memos and *New York Times* and *Washington Post* articles. The bulk of the text was a list of nearly a thousand sponsors. Along with the usual suspects on the anti-war liberal-Left, from Congresswoman Bella Abzug to Susan Sontag, Daniel Ellsberg, Jules Feiffer, Tom Hayden, Joan Baez, Philip and Daniel Berrigan, Jane Fonda, Fannie Lou Hamer, Country Joe McDonald, Huey P. Newton, and Jann Wenner, this list was dominated by contingents of professors from campuses like Antioch, California State at Los Angeles, Catholic University, Columbia, George Washington, Hampshire, Harvard, MIT, New York University (NYU), Rutgers, Stanford, Berkeley,

Santa Cruz, the University of Maryland, the University of Massachusetts, American University, and various City University of New York colleges. Evidently the organizing took place school by school, which was clarified when two of those professors, Donald and Margaret Bray, announced in the *Nation* a "Week of Solidarity with the Popular Forces in Chile" for October 8 through 14, naming themselves as coordinators.<sup>5</sup>

On September 28, the *New York Times* also ran stories announcing that the six-thousand-member Authors League of America had sent cablegrams to the Chilean Writers Society deploring "the book burning and suppression of writers by the Chilean Government," and that the Committee for Latin American Studies at Harvard, joined by the president of MIT, Jerome Wiesner, and John P. Lewis, dean of the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, had appealed to the U.S. government to "exert the strongest pressure" on the junta "to stop its reign of terror." A few days later it was announced that the Latin American Studies Association (LASA), which turned sharply left in the early 1970s) and various universities such as NYU were joining with Amnesty International and the office of Senator Edward Kennedy to find academic positions for newly exiled Chilean scholars. Read together, the effect of this concerted institutional denunciation was to effectively stigmatize the Pinochet junta, a burden from which it never recovered.<sup>6</sup>

Of all these protests, what irritated the junta most was an ad campaign begun on January 27, 1974, by the Emergency Committee to Save Chilean Health Workers, which charged in yet another *New York Times* ad, over the names of several hundred doctors, that the junta had killed pro-Allende doctors and initiated a "policy that closed health centers, cut back milk and supplemental health programs, burned libraries, decimated the faculties of medical schools and schools of public health and placed them under military control." This committee grew from an established leftwing New York medical group, the Physicians Forum. In response, the Pinochet regime ran its own advertisement on February 24, 1974, "The Real Story of the Persecution of Doctors in Chile." Its fabrications were rebutted in another ad by the Emergency Committee on September 15, 1974, commemorating the coup's anniversary, which suggested that "it is as if American military and economic aid had been used to support the Nazis, fund the Gestapo, and maintain Auschwitz, Belsen and Dachau." A week earlier the news had broken of the CIA's committing \$8 million to overturn Allende through what *New York*

*Times* columnist Tom Wicker called "gangster schemes of bribery, violence and even assassination," so this language did not seem especially inflammatory.

Intellectuals were not limited to these expressions of professional sympathy, or to the conventional forms of activism like the stream of articles on torture and repression in the *New York Review of Books* and *Harper's*. They also acted directly. The murders of Charles Hornan and Frank Teruggi by the Chilean military in late September 1973, in the context of the arrests, beating, and expulsions of numerous U.S. citizens, were key events in catalyzing public outrage and congressional intervention. The primary goad in making the Hornan and Teruggi cases a public scandal was a prominent Latin Americanist, Professor Richard R. Fagen of Stanford, vice president of LASA. He and three other LASA officers went to Washington, D.C., immediately following the coup, to pressure Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Jack Kubisch. Fagen then flew to Santiago, where he "uncovered a whole series of outrages." He led the effort to contact the victim's families (in Teruggi's case, the State Department had told them nothing) and to bring the case to the attention of U.S. reporters, who pursued it with a vengeance.<sup>7</sup> Fagen also wrote a nine-page letter to Senator Fulbright, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, spurring high-level congressional pressure on the State Department.

Fagen was the first of many North Americans to fly down to Chile, conducting personal diplomacy on behalf of established institutions openly at odds with U.S. policy. When the trials of former Socialist and Communist officials began in the spring of 1974, a Lawyers Committee on Chile was set up in New York, which delegated as "observers" at the trials Orville Schell, head of the Bar Association of the City of New York, and Paul O'Dwyer, former U.S. Senate candidate and head of the New York City Council.<sup>8</sup> It is not surprising that when the junta moved to improve its public relations through a contract with a subsidiary of the J. Walter Thompson ad agency, it stipulated that the major targets would be "government leaders, intellectuals and other decision-makers in the United States."<sup>9</sup>

While academics, doctors, and lawyers mobilized immediately around Chile, the uncredentialed Marxist Left moved more haltingly. In the weeks after the coup, there were dozens of protests, but they were relatively small in comparison to the scale of the antiwar movement of the early 1970s. The *Guardian* weekly, the newspaper of record for the

New Left, reported rallies in New York, San Francisco, Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., Pittsburgh, Ann Arbor, Philadelphia, Boston, St. Louis, Baltimore, Austin, Iowa City, Indianapolis, Denver, and Memphis between September 12 and 18, most involving a few hundred people. Several weeks later, thirty-five cities were claimed to be participating in the "Week of Solidarity with the Popular Forces of Chile," with an emphasis on teach-ins and memorial services, but no major national demonstrations were called.<sup>10</sup>

The divisions of the later Chile Solidarity Movement were apparent even at this stage, however. Since leftist infighting was a significant factor in the 1970s, it is worth briefly examining, as it undermined not only solidarity organizing for Chile, but also many other radical campaigns in those years. The same *Guardian* that reported "Thousands Protest Coup" also carried a long analysis by Steven Torgoff, "Revisionism and Counter-Revolution in Chile." At the very moment that hundreds of Chilean Communists were being hunted down and shot, Torgoff indicted the "revisionist" Chilean Communist Party for betraying the workers because of its "petty bourgeois" orientation. How does one explain this seeming betrayal (or blaming the victim) to a later generation?

The year 1973 was the climax of the "new communist" movement, an attempt to build a new Marxist-Leninist party out of the hard core of the New Left, and the *Guardian* was key to this doomed effort. The central principle uniting the thousands of youthful "new communist" party builders was attacking the Soviet Union and the "old Communists" who supported it around the world, including the Communist Party USA (CPUSA). The debilitating rivalry between "new communists," who were highly critical of Allende, and the more moderate CPUSA, which identified closely with the Popular Unity government, persisted throughout the consolidation of an organized Chile solidarity network in 1974 and 1975.<sup>11</sup>

Between 1974 and 1975, U.S. Communists established leadership over the heterogeneous local groups that sprang up after the coup, such as the Los Angeles Coalition for the Restoration of Democracy in Chile, the Michigan Committee for a Free Chile, the Colorado May Chile Be Free Committee, and the Chicago Citizen's Committee to Save Lives in Chile. Two national conferences were held, from which a National Coordinating Center in Solidarity with Chile was established under the leadership of an experienced CPUSA organizer, Susan Borenstein. Key

to the party's ability to bring together this broad network was its status as the only U.S. organization with formal ties to Allende's coalition, via the Chilean Communists. As a consequence, when prominent exiles such as former government ministers and Allende's widow visited the United States, it was Communists who organized their tours and hosted them. Many of these local Communist activists were well established in the antiwar movement, in unions, and even in Democratic Party circles, where their CPUSA affiliations were not publicly admitted.

The New York-based National Chile Center, as it became known, effectively tied together many different strands of activism. It recruited Cynthia Buhl, a young human rights activist from Oregon who would become the principal Washington, D.C., lobbyist on Latin America in the 1980s, and its board of directors included Mary Ann Mahaffey, a Detroit City Council member, and a prominent historian of Latin America, John Coatsworth, who in the 1990s served as president of the American Historical Association. It organized speaking events by exiled Popular Unity leaders and 1977-78 concert tours by the famous "Nuevo Cancion" groups Quilapayun and Inti-Illimani that included celebrity appearances by Jon Voight, Leonard Bernstein, Jane Fonda, Peter, Paul and Mary, and Senators Edward Kennedy, James Abourezk, and George McGovern. A Chile Legislative Center was opened in Washington, staffed by the Reverend Charles Briody, and considerable emphasis was put on lobbying, with close but unpublicized relations maintained to Senator Kennedy's office—the command post for antijunta work on the Hill.

Throughout this period, however, there was a different strain of solidarity activism that rejected the pragmatic emphasis on human rights, the legislative focus, and the alliances with liberals championed by the National Chile Center. The national Chile Solidarity conferences always included a minority Anti-Imperialist Caucus led by supporters of Chile's clandestine Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), which had refused to join Allende's coalition and criticized it as insufficiently revolutionary. In late 1975, the anti-imperialists split off to form an organization called Non-Intervention in Chile (NICHD), committed to a more militant style of protest and to making the connections between U.S. corporate capitalism at home and in Chile. As Seattle NICHD put it: "It is central to our work to educate the people in the U.S. to the issues of 1) how did the repression in Chile come about? and 2) how is the Chilean experience relevant to the people of the U.S.?"<sup>12</sup>

Diplomatic historians may doubt the significance of this solidarity organizing by the "far" Left, far out of the political mainstream. But the tendency to disparage radicalism as removed from what happens on Capitol Hill reflects a myopia about who actually generates letters and phone calls and visits to congressional offices. The business of radicals is to make life uncomfortable for those who are not radical, and the combined forces of Chile Solidarity proved they could do that on many occasions, as when a Chilean Navy sailing ship, the *Esmerelda*, was invited to participate in "Operation Sail" during the 1976 Bicentennial. It was alleged that the schooner had served as a torture center after the coup, and the storm of protest reached all the way into the august New York Yacht Club. Moreover, these gadfly campaigns to annoy the Pinochet junta occurred in a larger global context of condemnation, reflecting the United States' general loss of authority after the debacle of Vietnam. A July 1974 Pan-European Conference for Solidarity with Chile attracted leaders of both Communist and historically anticommunist social democratic parties and was keynoted by François Mitterand, the future president of France. A hemispheric conference in Mexico City was addressed by President Luis Echavarría, and Representative Michael Harrington, a Massachusetts Democrat and antagonist of the CIA, served as one of the U.S. delegates. Closer to home, in September 1974, the newly formed Center for National Security Studies, a left-leaning think tank, organized a "congressional conference" on Capitol Hill sponsored by Michigan senator Philip Hart, where CIA director William Colby answered questions from panelists like Richard Barnet of the Institute for Policy Studies and was booed for his insistence that there was no policy of deliberate assassination in the Phoenix Program he had directed in Vietnam.<sup>13</sup> Solidarity with Chile, like opposition to the U.S. war in Vietnam, was ultimately a worldwide phenomenon, and those who carried that banner in the United States had powerful allies abroad.

A world removed from the Marxist Left was the surge in church activism catalyzed by the coup in Chile. From the first day, the junta had targeted U.S. missionaries in Chile, and for good reason, since the Chilean group Christians for Socialism had attracted numerous North American supporters. Two Maryknoll priests, Francis Flynn and Joseph Dougherty, were expelled in the first days, as well as a Methodist volunteer, Carol Nezzo, and the Reverend Charles Welch of the Holy Cross Missioners. In late October 1973, St. George's College, an elite school run

by U.S. priests that was opened to the poor during the Allende years, was taken over by a Chilean Air Force officer because it was "infiltrated by Marxism." The key figure in founding the Washington Office on Latin America, the main hemispheric human rights lobby in the past quarter century, was the Reverend Joseph Eldridge, another Methodist who was expelled after the coup. This pattern did not abate. In September 1974, the superior of the Holy Cross order, Father Robert Plasker, was put on a plane, and in late 1975, three U.S. nuns were expelled for allegedly hiding guerrillas of the MIR.<sup>14</sup>

What is most striking is the Catholic hierarchy's declaring its open opposition to U.S. policy in Latin America. This was a watershed moment in the evolution of post-Vietnam politics. From the Cold War's beginning, the Catholic Church was a pillar of anticommunism, at home and abroad. But North American Catholic perspectives had been changing since the 1960s, in response to epochal shifts in the Latin American Church. A new doctrine and practice called "Liberation Theology," intended to align the church with the vast poverty-stricken majority of its communicants rather than elites, began germinating in Brazil in the 1950s. In the 1960s, it swept across the Americas, stimulated by the Vatican II reforms of Popes John XXIII and Paul VI, and culminating in the 1968 Medellín Conference, where the assembled Latin American bishops declared a "preferential option for the poor."<sup>15</sup> The North American Church was not immune to these influences. During these years, thousands of priests, religious men and women, and lay volunteers went south as Papal Volunteers for Latin America (the *National Catholic Reporter* claimed four thousand from U.S. dioceses by 1966), and many of them came home radicalized, committed to spreading a new gospel of solidarity. The example of the Columbian priest Camilo Torres, killed in 1966 while fighting with a guerrilla group, attracted considerable attention in the United States (he was eulogized by Dorothy Day, among others) and in a case famous among the U.S. religious, a group of Maryknoll men and women were expelled from Guatemala in late 1967 as they were about to form their own Christian guerrilla front.<sup>16</sup> Similar processes of "reverse mission" affected numerous Protestant missionaries, like the Reverend Philip Wheaton, an Episcopal priest who left the death squad-ridden Dominican Republic to found the Ecumenical Program for Inter-American Communication and Action, the first church-based organization dealing with Latin America, in 1968.

A good example of the deep changes among North American Christians, affecting even the institutional structure of the Catholic Church, can be found in the 1970 conference of the Catholic Inter-American Cooperation Program. Initiated in 1964 by the Latin America Division of the U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC), by 1970 an openly radical message was preached to the four-hundred-odd participants in Washington, D.C. The theme was "Conscientization for Liberation," and speakers included Gustavo Gutiérrez, the Peruvian theologian later silenced by Pope John Paul II; James Petras, the best-known Marxist scholar on Latin America in the United States; Paolo Freire, the eminent theorist of radical pedagogy; the Reverend Philip Wheaton; and Senator Frank Church.<sup>17</sup>

The Chilean coup was a catalyst in this emerging process of "conscientization" within the U.S. Church and its hierarchy. In October 1973, the Reverend Frederick McGuire, director of the USCC's Latin America Division, went to Santiago to investigate the human rights situation. His first-person report in the November 30 *National Catholic Reporter* was headlined "Freedoms Snuffed Out in Chile." It was unambiguously pro-Allende and condemned unnamed figures in the Chilean Catholic hierarchy that had lent official sanction to the military junta. By itself, this report and subsequent calls for action on human rights in Chile by McGuire's office would indicate merely that there were substantial liberal elements in the Church who were permitted to speak out. However, the requirements of what both radicals and prelates called "Christian solidarity" soon extended all the way to the top. The twenty-eight bishops sitting on the Administrative Board of the USCC—the highest-ranking body in U.S. Catholicism—voted unanimously on February 13, 1974, to denounce abuses of human rights by the governments of Chile and Brazil, and to urge the U.S. government to consider ending aid to these countries. They were led in this action by John Cardinal Krol of Philadelphia, the USCC president, who underlined his commitment a few months later by sending a telegram of "solidarity" to Cardinal Raul Silva of Chile, under fierce attack by Pinochet and his supporters for speaking out against torture.

The USCC's action, which committed the church offices in Washington to lobby against the junta and sanctioned action by hundreds of bishops and tens of thousands of priests and religious, is only a glimpse into the world of U.S. Catholic politics around Latin America during

the 1970s and 1980s. It was largely church people, for instance, that bedeviled ITT's annual meetings for years, picketing in the hundreds and using their pension-fund holdings to make impudent suggestions inside, such as the nomination of Charles Hornan's widow, Joyce, as a corporate director.<sup>18</sup> However, it is a good place to end this outline of the anti-interventionist, even anti-imperialist, coalition that mobilized opposition to U.S. government policies in Chile, and later on a much larger scale when Central America became a battleground of the "new Cold War" in the 1980s.

Religious activism in the Chile Solidarity Movement, at the grassroots and the highest institutional levels, forces us to rethink the character of the New Left and the antiwar movement, and the results of the Sixties. The mobilization of radical Christians, more precisely the radicalization of mobilized Christians (like that of a section of the professional-intellectual elite described earlier), underlines that the "New Left" of white college students was only one part of the larger Left that cohered during the Sixties. Here, as elsewhere, I argue that an amorphous bloc that spanned the distance between polite liberalism and unalloyed radicalism came together originally in opposition to U.S. policies in the Third World, most importantly the war in Indochina, and that rather than falling apart, this broad foreign policy opposition consolidated and advanced in the Seventies.<sup>19</sup> This is the only way we can explain Jimmy Carter, who positioned himself in the dead center of the Democratic Party to win its 1976 nomination, turning to Gerald Ford during a presidential debate on October 6, 1976, and saying: "I notice that Mr. Ford did not comment on the prisons in Chile. This is a typical example, maybe of others, that this administration overthrew an elected government and helped establish a military dictatorship." In politics, opportunism is the most sincere form of flattery, and at that moment Carter certified that the "Vietnam syndrome," or opposition to Cold War interventionism, had become an underlying fact in U.S. political life. Though well understood in Washington, D.C., policy circles and by right-wing strategists, among scholars this is the least recognized legacy of the Sixties, though fully as significant as the "culture wars" that conservatives have publicized. It suggests that the "New Left," if we appreciate the breadth of what that term implies, never was defeated or dissolved. Rather, it melded into the fabric of our political institutions and habits, and by doing so, changed them profoundly.



## NOTES

1. Charles DeBenedetti with Charles Chatfield, *An American Ordeal: The Anticommunist Movement of the Vietnam Era* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1990), esp. chap. 11, "Normalizing Dissent"; Melvin Small, *Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1988).
2. Lars Schoultz, *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 75, 371.
3. Sigmund offers only a general explanation for what he four times calls the "sense of culpability which many Americans felt after the coup." He stresses that "this sense of culpability had an important effect on U.S. policy, since the U.S. role in Chile was probably the single most influential case leading the American public and policy makers to make important changes in their view of the goals of American foreign policy." He quotes Senator J. William Fulbright to the effect that an "unprecedented number of telegrams, letters, and phone calls" expressing opposition to the junta flooded Congress after the coup, but he attributes public disapproval to a single event: "The most important medium through which the American public was persuaded of U.S. involvement was the book *The Execution of Charles Hornam: An American Sacrifice* by Thomas Hauser . . . and the film based on the book, *Missing*, starring Jack Lemmon and Sissy Spacek." How a 1978 book and a 1982 film could spur a two-year debate leading to an aid cutoff in 1976 is never explained (Paul E. Sigmund, *The United States and Democracy in Chile* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993], 80, 85, 80).
4. Schoultz, *Human Rights*, 364, 370. Schoultz identifies five factors, culminating in Jimmy Carter's championing of human rights combined with the lack of any major security threat in Latin America in the mid- and late 1970s.
5. *Nation*, October 22, 1973.
6. For an in-depth study of the politics of Latin American studies in the United States, see Mark T. Berger, *Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and U.S. Hegemony in the Americas, 1898-1990* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). However, Berger misses the significance of both the North American Congress on Latin America, founded in 1966 and still going strong at the present with its widely read political-scholarly journal, the *NACLA Report*, and the more short-lived Union of Radical Latin Americanists (URLA), which from 1970 on mounted an aggressive campaign to force LASA to debate and denounce U.S. policy in the hemisphere.
7. *Nation*, October 29, 1973.
8. *New York Times*, April 14, 1974.
9. Schoultz, *Human Rights*, 53.
10. *Guardian*, September 26 and October 3 and 10, 1973.
11. See Max Elbaum, *Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao, and Che* (London: Verso, 2002), for a meticulous critical history of this stage of the New Left.
12. A proposed amendment in "Response to the Proposed Definition of the Anti-Imperialist Caucus (AIC) of the National Coordinating Center in Solidarity with Chile (NCCSC)" quoted in Van Gosse, "El Salvador Is Spanish for Vietnam": The Politics of Solidarity and the New Immigrant Left, 1955-1993," in Paul Buhle and Dan Georgakas, eds., *The Immigrant Left* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 312, 324.
13. *New York Times*, July 8 and September 14, 1974; February 23, 1975.
14. *National Catholic Reporter*, September 27, 1974; *New York Times*, November 6, 7, 8, 12, and 16, 1975.
15. The best histories of this shift and its relation to U.S. hemispheric policy are by Penny Lernoux: *Cry of the People: United States Involvement in the Rise of Fascism, Torture, and Murder and the Persecution of the Catholic Church in Latin America* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1980) and *People of God: The Struggle for World Catholicism* (New York: Viking, 1989).
16. See Thomas and Marjorie Melville, *Whose Heaven? Whose Earth?* (New York: Knopf, 1970). The Melvilles, who married after they left their orders, were two of the Catonsville Nine, a group of Catholic activists led by the priests Daniel and Philip Berrigan, who invaded a draft board in Catonsville, Maryland, in May 1968, burned hundreds of files of young men awaiting induction, and then waited for arrest. This celebrated case inspired dozens of similar raids by a so-called Catholic Left.
17. See the proceedings in Louis M. Colomense, ed., *Conscientization for Liberation: New Dimensions in Hemispheric Realities* (Washington, D.C.: Division for Latin America, U.S. Catholic Conference, 1971); also Thomas E. Quigley, ed., *Freedom and Unfreedom in the Americas: Towards a Theology of Liberation* (New York: IDOC-North America, 1971). From the late 1960s through the century's end, Quigley was the key policy adviser on Latin America at USCC, part of a larger Washington, D.C., leadership that had considerable impact on policy making.
18. *New York Times*, May 9, 1974.
19. Van Gosse, *Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America, and the Making of a New Left* (London: Verso, 1993); "Active Engagement: The Legacy of Central America Solidarity," *NACLA Report*, 28, 5 (March/April 1995), 22-29; "A Movement of Movements: The Definition and Periodization of the New Left," in Roy Rosenzweig and Jean-Christophe Agnew, eds., *Blackwell Companion to Post-1945 America* (London: Blackwell, 2002), 277-302; *The American New Left: A History* (New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, forthcoming).