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COLD WAR CONSTRUCTIONS

The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945–1966

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"We Are All Highly Adventurous"
Fidel Castro and the Romance of the White Guerrilla, 1957–1958

VAN GOSSE

AT THE COLD WAR'S HEIGHT in the late 1950s, a wide range of U.S. citizens enthusiastically backed Fidel Castro's 26th of July Revolutionary Movement. Beginning with Herbert L. Matthews's famous February 1957 articles in *The New York Times*, where he proved that "the rebel leader of Cuba's youth . . . is alive and fighting hard and successfully in the rugged, almost impenetrable fastnesses of the Sierra Maestra," Castro was lionized by the U.S. press. Meanwhile *fidelista* Cuban exiles staged stateside demonstrations and ran guns, and numerous young North Americans tried to get into Cuba to fight alongside the picturesque guerrillas.[1]

This essay begins by considering some of the reasons why this episode was ignored for several decades, placing the seemingly anomalous pro-Castroism of the late 1950s within a longer historical tradition that predates the Cold War. It then examines the types of North Americans who acted upon their identification with the Cuban rebels—journalists, liberal members of the "political public," disaffected youth—and seeks to understand the sources and meaning of their convictions.[2] Having specified who supported Castro and why, I concentrate upon the reasons why the Cuban Revolution, of all the post-1945 third world insurgencies, achieved this singular level of support in the United States, and how the character of "Yankee *fidelismo*" changed after the revolutionary victory. New groups—specifically African Americans—found in Castro a champion both symbolic and real, as others retreated in the face of intensifying U.S.-Cuban hostility. What had been a mainstream, nonpolitical ethos of sympathy and admiration rapidly evolved into a more isolated, New Leftist brand of activism, leading to the founding of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in early 1960.

The revolution was in power, and the romance was over—though perhaps a new one was beginning.

The Pro-Insurgent Tradition

The sympathetic media coverage of 1957–58, the popular interest that this coverage both reflected and stimulated, and a demonstrable North American presence within the ranks of the tiny Rebel Army all combine to form a unique moment in High Cold War culture. At no other point in the post-1945 period did so many ordinary Americans unabashedly embrace a foreign insurgency of fatigue-clad, gun-toting rebels. However, the public articulation of pro-Castro sentiments was less remarkable at the time than in retrospect, because in the 1950s there was still a residual familiarity with the phenomenon of journalistically driven bandwagons for other peoples' wars of liberation. This long-running custom stretched back to philo-Jacobinism among Jeffersonians during the Republic's earliest days. For the next 150 years, Bolívar, Lafayette, von Steuben, Kościuszko, Kossuth, Garibaldi, Juárez, Zapata, and even Villa were celebrated in sentimental texts and, in the case of the latter three Mexican revolutionary figures, major Hollywood films. Cuba, of course, was the subject of the most intensive public campaign of all in the years leading up to the Spanish-American War, when journalists like Richard Harding Davis produced eyewitness accounts of Spanish atrocities and heroic Cuban resistance, and newspaper magnates like William Randolph Hearst strenuously promoted a military intervention on behalf of the oppressed Cuban people.[3]

The events of 1898, the Mexican Revolution of the 'teens and twenties, and even the tumult in a perpetually revolutionary Cuba during the thirties all seemed much less "past" in the late 1950s than they would even a few years later. The oft-evoked changing of the guard from Eisenhower, a young officer in 1917–18, to Kennedy, a hero of the Second World War, had not yet taken place. Thus, a reassuring sense of continuity underlay Castro's appeal. From 1957 through the first months of 1959, he appeared to be a welcome extension of an established tradition rather than an aberration or a threat.

Historians of the Cold War, to the extent that they are aware of this tradition, have assumed it to be anachronistic and irrelevant to events after 1945. Though journalists and scholars are aware of Castro's popularity in 1957–58, in later years no one has given it more than passing, bemused comment. To most observers, the pro-insurgent disposition vanished with the coming of

the "national security state" under the aegis of NSC-68, and was replaced by the manufactured celebration of quasi-reformist strongmen like Ngo Dinh Diem in "South" Vietnam.[4]

There are many seemingly ephemeral episodes involving popular sentiments at odds with the concerns of the political elite, and it is not surprising that they become footnotes in the historical record. Obviously enough, a few years of pro-Castroism in the United States have been forgotten because they were rapidly supplanted by decades of intense, officially sanctioned anti-Castroism. Within months of Castro's triumphal April 1959 tour of East Coast cities, mainstream sympathy toward the Cuban Revolution had largely dissipated, replaced by a bitter war of words and diplomatic sanctions that culminated in the Kennedy administration's humiliation at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. From that moment on, the hostility toward Castro within the political and journalistic establishment—the sense that he was not only a sworn opponent, but a personal enemy and a betrayer of America's goodwill—overwhelmed the earlier memory of his favorable reception. Other than a brief outpouring of interest in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in 1960–61, and similar flurries on the liberal Left at later times, the only visible activism on Cuba has been that of the militant and well-organized exile movement based in south Florida, which has actively sought to overthrow the revolutionary leader for nearly four decades.

But this episode's rapid consignment to oblivion cannot be explained only as a result of its submersion by later events and a sea change in American attitudes. After all, "Yalta" as a symbol of Soviet-American rapprochement and liberal folly has remained a fighting word in American politics for many years. Something deeper and more confusing was at work: an inability to remember a moment of promise when it seemed that the United States, not just a few policymakers thinking instrumentally but its own people, could embrace a revolution in a country with a colonial relationship to our own. That this promise was naïve and doomed in the context of the Cold War does not vitiate its significance as a barometer of popular politics during the late 1950s.

In this case, timing was everything. It is inconceivable that Castro could have become a hero among North Americans (indeed, the kind of hero he intended to be) a few years earlier or later. His rise to fame and his fleeting, amused, and always slightly parodied glory captures perfectly the ambience of the late Eisenhower years, when the civil rights movement had first emerged and the Soviet Union began to thaw in the minds of Americans. The moment was ripe for a certain kind of insurgent, one who was sufficiently familiar and politically ambiguous, and above all who passed for "white" and could bridge the ever more tenuous color line.

The Yankee Fidelistas

One does not have to go far to prove that Castro's *Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de Julio* was celebrated in the United States during its two years of hit-and-run warfare against the dictator Fulgencio Batista, a traditional Washington ally. The principal vehicles for this celebration were numerous North American journalists and the eminent institutions they represented, leading some conservatives to accuse the press of selling Castro to an unsuspecting U.S. public. Witness the notorious 1960 cartoon in William F. Buckley's *National Review*, picturing a grinning Fidel with the legend "I Got My Job Through the *New York Times*."[5]

The naïveté of this view should not prevent us from acknowledging the weight of press support for Castro's hirsute *barbudos*, or "bearded ones," a term relished by newsmen. For two years, their skirmishes were covered in breathless detail by nearly all of the national print media. *Time*, the premier organ of Henry Luce, publicist for the American Century, ran thirty-one stories in less than two years on "This Man Castro," repeatedly evoking America's revolutionary past in homages to Castro's "six hundred wily sharpshooters." *Life*, the other major Luce organ, ran several full-page spreads, including a remarkably jolly feature on U.S. businessmen and soldiers held hostage in the mountains by Fidel's brother Raul as insurance against Batista's bombing raids (one American airman declared, "I am just like one of them," and *Time* quoted another as saying Raul, "a swell guy," had provided "good food and plenty of it, and beds with clean sheets"). Perhaps most surprisingly, Jules Dubois, star reporter for the *Chicago Tribune*, the beacon of the midwestern Old Right, was Herbert Matthews's closest competitor as a public friend of Castro.[6]

The height of this engagement with the guerrilla *mística* was the May 9, 1957, CBS primetime special, "Rebels of the Sierra Maestra: The Story of Cuba's Jungle Fighters." Placing Fidel and his tiny band amid scenes of mountain rusticity, minus any visible enemy or fighting, it suggested a boyishly pure commitment. For American viewers, this spartan scenario was in exemplary contrast to Havana, the hemisphere's synonym for a permanent nightlife of roulette wheels and unmentionable fleshpots. The journalist who made that film, Robert Taber, would found the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in 1960.

One cannot blame the U.S. press for having a field day in Cuba in 1957–58. The tableaux on constant display invited a luxuriant pastiche: foreign revelers carrying on oblivious to a savage conflict only blocks away; bombings, official murders, and assassination attempts denied by a flagrantly corrupt government; Castro's bombastic personality, with his black-framed spectacles, cigars, curly whiskers, and olive-green fatigues complemented by a sniper's rifle with a telescopic sight.

All of the above would have been more distant and objectively rendered, of course, if Cuba were not—as constantly repeated—"only ninety miles away," a quick jaunt from Miami for Americans looking for a wild weekend. It is this last point that has been most forgotten by North Americans (but not of course by Cubans). By the 1950s, Havana was quite literally the whorehouse of the Caribbean. For decades it had stood for a riotous nightlife, "rum and Coca-Cola," the mambo, showgirls, and nightclubs, but by the fifties, under Batista, U.S. organized crime had invested massively. As a consequence, there was nothing like it in the Western Hemisphere. Poised somewhere between the French Riviera and Mexican border towns like Tijuana, Havana was a cornucopia of vice. A young serviceman named Everett LeRoi Jones who visited there in 1956 would later write about its reputation as the "best liberty in the world," and the New Jersey businessman who initiated the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, an inveterate liberal and devotee of I. F. Stone, would explain his admiration of Castro in terms of his revulsion of what Cuba had been formerly: "It's where you went for gambling, drinking, drugs. . . . I wouldn't go to Spain either."[7]

The media's fascination with Cuba's back-alley civil war reflected and spurred two other currents of solidarity. At an elite level, support for Castro grew from Cold War liberals' widely voiced concern that the West was losing the battle for the "developing world" because of its reliance upon outright repression and outmoded despots. As early as 1956, Adlai Stevenson had warned of this danger in his presidential campaign, while Senator John F. Kennedy had scored points with a forceful speech against French policy in Algeria. The most famous example of this perspective was the best-selling 1958 novel *The Ugly American,* in which provincial State Department blockheads and political appointees deliver a fictional Asian nation to the Communists through their racism and refusal to acknowledge local realities.[8]

One retrospective version of how elite opinion functioned as self-criticism and goad in these years is a 1963 *Saturday Evening Post* article, "The Fruit of Castro's Plotting," by the influential columnist Stewart Alsop.

After traveling "10,000 miles through the Caribbean and Central America," Alsop cited approvingly the opinion of an anonymous U.S. ambassador that "Fidel Castro is the best thing the Lord ever did for us." He then explained the four major ways in which "Fidel Castro has served the vital interests of the United States."

> First, he has reminded us North Americans of the existence—and the importance to our nation—of Latin America. Second, he has shown the Latin American "intellectuals" the reality, not the dream, of Communism. In so doing, he has acted as a sort of inoculation against the Communist smallpox in this hemisphere. Third, Castro has thrown a badly needed scare into the Latin-American ruling class. Without such a scare, the Kennedy Administration's Alliance for Progress would not stand a ghost of a chance of succeeding. Fourth, Castro and Khrushchev have given the United States an opportunity to demonstrate, for all the world to see, where the real center for power in this hemisphere lies.[9]

One could scarcely ask for a better indictment of America as a sleeping giant stoking the furnaces of revolution through indifference. But Alsop did not write simply as a journalist, an anonymous observer. With his brother Joseph, he epitomized the well-connected Washington insider, among whom the view was widespread that some form of populistic, managed reform was necessary to head off all-out social revolution. It was such men who pushed the mini-boomlets in the United States for Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines and Diem.[10]

It is hardly surprising, then, that early in John F. Kennedy's presidential campaign, he spoke of Castro in generous terms, as "part of the legacy of Bolivar," a "fiery young rebel" who might "have taken a more rational course after his victory had the United States Government not backed the dictator Batista so long and so uncritically." In the fall of 1960, however, Kennedy would cut sharply to Richard Nixon's right with the jibe, "If you can't stand up to Castro, how can you be expected to stand up to Khrushchev?" and a coy suggestion that the United States fund a counterrevolution, but his liberal backers preferred to believe the true JFK was committed to the grand promises of the Alliance for Progress.[11]

Under Kennedy, Castro was an in-the-flesh demonstration of things gone awry. In 1957–58, however, he functioned as a credible alternative for some on the outer edges of U.S. diplomacy. The Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom (IADF), a group of social democrats and liberals that linked figures like Norman Thomas, Roger Baldwin, and Arthur M.

Schlesinger, Jr., with the hemisphere's "Democratic Left" led by Costa Rica's José Figueres and Venezuela's Rómulo Betancourt, weighed in on Castro's behalf with press conferences, letters-to-the-editor, and lobbying visits denouncing Batista. In Congress, an Oregon Democratic freshman and IADF ally named Charles Porter made a name for himself denouncing U.S. collaboration with Caribbean despots, from the Dominican Republic's Trujillo to Cuba's Batista. CIA officers under diplomatic cover in Cuba funneled a modest amount of aid to the *fidelistas*, and encouraged pro-Castro feeling among U.S. journalists, though the U.S. military mission in Havana remained staunchly pro-Batista. And at a decisive moment in March 1958, Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., weighed in with well-documented denunciations of Eisenhower administration complicity in Batista's atrocities, helping to instigate an embargo on military aid which undercut the Cuban regime.[12]

But no matter how enthusiastic, solidarity with Castro among the elite was always conditional and self-conscious, as indicated by the subtitle of Jules Dubois's otherwise adulatory book, *Fidel Castro: Rebel—Liberator or Dictator?* The dust jacket of this exceptionally topical portrait (published in March of 1959, just two months after Batista's fall; by the fall its author was denouncing Castro) is a balancing act in microcosm. It included a photo of the two men leaning on a small camp table, captioned "Castro grants his first interview after victory to the author, Dubois," and a reproduction of a signed February 14, 1959, letter from Fidel to Dubois:

> Every person in the society of free nations—and even those who are oppressed under the heels of dictators—has a right to express his or her opinion. Under the tyranny of Fulgencio Batista that right was denied to the people of Cuba.
>
> It is the duty of every newspaperman to report the news, for only with freedom of the press can there be political freedom.
>
> Should your book contain errors and should your opinions expressed therein be mistaken or unjust, I shall not hesitate to express my own opinions about the contents of the book when it is published.[13]

Herbert L. Matthews of *The New York Times* also described himself publicly as Castro's "friend" and was a main protagonist in this drama, traveling across the island in a "glare of publicity" to meet with antigovernment groups in the spring of 1957, and publicizing the arrests of 26th of July leaders to save them from execution. But it was Matthews's status as an expert that redeemed his partisanship. Very few North Americans knew much about Castro, and none had his degree of access. Under these circumstances, the *Times* was prepared to give him his head, but in later years Matthews would be officially silenced.[14]

Mainstream journalists and the liberals who listened to them did not exhaust Castro's support in the United States, and the public's enthusiasm was notably less modulated.[15] High-minded appreciations of the Cuban lawyer's abilities mixed with suggestions regarding his anti-Communist utility were all very well for *Time*. For some significant number of young American men, however—recent veterans, would-be soldiers of fortune, self-serious undergraduate "liberals," even a few juvenile delinquents—Fidel's derring-do, his amateurishness and bravado, seemed to set off an internal bomb. Hardly a decade since the invasion of Normandy, he set off to take the entire island of Cuba with eighty-two men in an old yacht, only twelve of whom survived the landing. For reasons that few articulated beyond a desire to get into "a good fire-fight" and see the world, North American men and boys flocked into the 26th of July Movement's offices in New York and elsewhere, and took cheap flights into Cuba; by late 1958 Batista's police were deporting any Yank wearing combat boots. Most were turned away or sobered up before they could get near the Sierra Maestra, but after Castro's victory twenty five were reported by *The New York Times* as fighting with the Rebel Army.[16]

Since there was no organized structure for funneling North American volunteers into Cuba (the Cubans were bemused by this outpouring, though Castro and others recognized that it garnered favorable publicity), we can only study the phenomenon through personal histories and evidence from newspaper records. The first and most famous case was that of three youths—fifteen, sixteen, and twenty-one years old—who fled their service families at the U.S. military's base at Guantánamo in eastern Cuba in early 1957 to join up with Castro. They were featured on Robert Taber's CBS documentary that spring, and apparently inspired many other U.S. volunteers. Next in visibility came "Captain" William Morgan, who claimed he was a former U.S. Army paratrooper and in 1957 assumed command rank with the "Second Front of the Escambray," a revolutionary group tenuously allied to the 26th of July Movement. Again, it was Herbert L. Matthews who acted as discoverer, and photos of a bearded, beret-wearing Morgan were flashed around the world.[17]

The last North American to garner an instant of fame from his exploits in Cuba was Donald Soldini, a Staten Islander who made up his mind to fight with Castro upon reading Matthews's initial articles, before news broke

of the runaways from Guantánamo. Soldini, like other eighteen-year-olds then and later, was seeking adventure at any cost, as long as the cause itself fit some general criteria of virtue. It took him many travails to get into Cuba, but once there he fought hard, was wounded in the neck, and escaped from a Batista prison cell. In late 1958, Soldini was back in the States, bringing dozens of former veterans and "screwballs" to Miami to form his own all-Yankee guerrilla column, a plan aborted only by Batista's untimely departure. He ended up on the Jack Paar show in 1959 (as did Castro himself a little earlier, in a live broadcast from Havana).[18]

There are many more of these stray anecdotes, such as the tale of the notorious CIA agent and Watergate conspirator Frank Sturgis (born Fiorini), who was photographed by the AP in January 1959 posing on a burial mound of executed secret policemen.[19] Taken all together, they may seem merely reflective of that aberrant brand of machismo that was typical of the fifties. However, the tale of the Yankees who aspired to become *fidelistas* helps us understand the power of Castroism in this hemisphere, and the social tensions inside the United States at that time.

As Richard Slotkin has pointed out, the problem with the American version of counterinsurgency is that it involved from the beginning "a peculiar kind of identification with the enemy"; through creating a perfect doppelgänger of peasant revolution, the people could be saved for their own (and America's) good. The fierce desire of U.S. men to fight in Cuba indicated long before Vietnam how counterinsurgency packaged as reform would draw in a certain kind of young American and in the end subvert itself.[20] There are numerous parallels, from the fictional hero of *The Ugly American* who beats the Russians at their own game through engineering projects that help the peasants, to the intense interest in the personal story of Dr. Tom Dooley, the American doctor stationed in Vietnam who waged a one-man crusade to heal bodies and win hearts, including overseeing the evacuation of thousands from the North after the French handover of power to Ho Chi Minh's Communists.[21] Recently, the diplomatic historian Lloyd Gardner has demonstrated that such an impulse reached to the very top, as even Lyndon Johnson dreamed of a grandiose Mekong Delta reclamation project to rival the Tennessee Valley Authority and draw all of Southeast Asia, Communist and pro-American alike, together in a new New Deal.[22]

Latin America and the Insurgent Moment

To assert that there was support for Castro does not indicate why this particular third world revolutionary achieved a mass popularity like no other. To

make sense of pro-Castro feeling in the United States, it must be situated historically and culturally.

In many ways Cuba stood alone, for reasons ranging from geographical proximity to cultural miscegenation. First is the historical fact of Cuba's relation to the United States, in the larger context of Latin America as a traditional sphere of influence and a largely ignored backwater.

In the ten years since 1945, the focus of U.S. foreign policy had been upon Europe first, and then Asia and Africa, the decolonizing world where Communists seemed poised to spring. Latin America, the land of seedy banana republics, was less threatening and was largely written off as static and easily controllable. In World War II, Americans had fought across Europe and the Pacific, in Burma and in North Africa; a little later, in Korea. In contrast, no GIs had been needed throughout the Ibero-American republics, which seemed to indicate the region's relative unimportance and quiescence. To most North Americans, the Pan-American republics seemed stuck in a primordial ooze of feudal indolence, a place where neither Germans nor Japanese, nor later Russians or Chinese, had ever successfully intruded. Almost completely forgotten were the long-running American military occupations in the Caribbean and Central America earlier in the century, as well as a widespread fascination with the Mexican Revolution among intellectuals and artists throughout the interwar period, and then the brief popular and governmental focus on Latin America in the later 1930s, prompted by concern over growing Nazi influence. From little children to senior citizens, most Americans in the fifties knew far more about Guadalcanal or the Ardennes than they did about São Paolo or the Andes.

North American perceptions of Latin America were given a special twist by Hollywood's long-standing habit of reducing the rest of the hemisphere to a convenient set of stereotypes. Besides the Latin Lover, the Mexican Spitfire, and the Lazy Peasant, there was a constant recourse to the thrills of Latin American revolution as quasi-banditry, with its palpable whiff of gunpowder and individual heroics. From the staged docudramas about Pancho Villa and the Mexican Revolution in the 'teens (for which Villa was paid a considerable sum) through *Viva Villa!* in 1934 and *Viva Zapata* in 1952, Latin America was the preferred site for cinematic rebellions, a commercial and cultural custom that was barely interrupted by the Cold War.[23]

These generalizations took on a special force regarding Cuba since it was closer to the United States than any other Latin American country except Mexico. It was widely understood to enjoy a kind of permanent protectorate status, even though the official right to intervene (codified in a Constitution drawn up under U.S. military occupation) was abrogated by Franklin Roo-

sevelt in 1934. North Americans regarded Cuba as a watering hole for Yankees in search of inexpensive luxuries, sexual and otherwise, and as a place where baseball teams trained.

The colonial relationship between the two nations had an unintended political result: the ability of a politicized exile community to build a base of community support impossible for dissidents from Argentina or Brazil, let alone Kenya or Vietnam. The many thousands of Cuban-Americans resident on the East Coast demonstrated vociferously against Batista, held fund-raising banquets for Castro, poured leaflets into the stands at Yankee Stadium, and even ran up their flag at Rockefeller Center, all the time receiving only the bemused tolerance accorded groups from the "captive nations" of Eastern Europe. The comparison was driven home by the Cubans, who constantly declared their country "the Hungary of the Americas," a reference with considerable import in 1957.

All of these overlapping contingencies coincided at the moment when Fidel Castro ran the yacht *Granma* ashore in the swamps of eastern Cuba in early December 1956. However, they were given a special piquancy by events specific to the United States itself. At the same time that overturning established orders seemed to be in the air internationally—the Hungarian uprising and the Suez crisis occurred just months before the *Granma's* landing—the United States was entering into a period of prolonged confusion about the role of young people.

For many historians, and the general public as well, the litany of "youth culture" happenings in 1955 and 1956—the rise and fall of James Dean, the rise into a world-historical stratosphere of Elvis Presley, the artifacts from *The Wild One* to *Howl*—must seem overdetermined. Material abundance and an absence of official restraints are by themselves deemed sufficient to explain a quasi-oppositional moment; if a hostile reception by itself can constitute oppositionality, as in the antipathy toward rock 'n' roll of forces ranging from *The New York Times* to the White Citizens Councils.

I would argue that to the extent the youth culture of the fifties was oppositional it was gender-specific and thoroughly racialized: young white men were the presumed subjects who cast themselves as role-players in a constantly fictionalized drama. This oppositionality (or at least a form of identity politics) required a universalist, indeed almost Popular-Frontist dismissal of class, ethnic, and regional differences that was quite new within American culture. The "white boy" as such no longer required any other markers, as southern, Irish, Italian, Jewish, or otherwise. Thus there was James Dean and Sal Mineo as a fated couple in *Rebel Without a Cause*, and the embrace

of a formerly repugnant type, the white-trash truck driver with slicked-back hair, a figure symbolized by a host of self-consciously vulgar musicians (many of them recording out of Memphis on the Sun label): Jerry Lee Lewis, Carl Perkins, Johnny Cash, Gene Vincent, Eddie Cochran, and Elvis Presley of course.[24]

This was the moment into which walked Fidel Castro, barely thirty. At a time of mumbled frustration and gleeful noise, his ascetic, high-flown braggadocio struck a surprising chord. Thousands read accounts of how at his treason trial in 1953, the young Castro had denounced his judges with the ringing words, "Sentence me. I don't mind. History will absolve me." *Time* writers painted Hemingwayesque word-pictures with acute silences: "Castro is a fighter; 16 months ago he invaded Cuba from a yacht. But he is also an articulate man interested in words, manifestoes, books (he treasures a volume of Montesquieu) and the language of ideas." Yale men debated whether "The United States Should Allow Its Citizens to Give Support to Fidel Castro." Berkeley students who would go on to form SLATE, the pioneering New Left campus party, planned an expedition to Cuba in early 1957 (they described themselves thus: "We consider ourselves liberals . . . we are all highly adventurous . . ."). And to ratify his fame, Castro finally came in person to U.S. campuses in April 1959, where he was cheered by thousands at Harvard and mobbed at Princeton.[25]

The adulation awarded Castro was one piece of a larger fascination with a certain type of male rebel—some combination of drawling, swaggering, uncouth, fey, and inarticulate—which represented a strikingly visible alternative to the clean-cut, middle-class, conventionally handsome WASP, the stolid sort usually played in big-budget Hollywood films by Rock Hudson. So perhaps the best way to decipher Fidel's appeal is to pair him explicitly with the central character in the construction of this alternative: Elvis Presley.

Like Elvis, the key to Castro's charisma was both sexual and racial. Both managed to be "quite a man" (a phrase used by Herbert Matthews in his first article describing Fidel), and yet thoroughly odd. In Elvis's case, it was the sensual, languid, garish character of his face and hair and clothes and his soft, shy-boy manner (which in other circumstances would have marked him as "a queer"), combined with the rutting, thrusting, playful force of his vocal and visual attack.

Castro of course was no rock 'n' roll star, and did not go on the Ed Sullivan show until January 1959, just after he chased Batista out of Havana. But long before that North American boys read about him and gazed at still

photographs. What they saw was equally transgressive. On the one hand, he was obviously a big, physically powerful person, and in every photo from late 1956 through the mid-1990s, he is seen wearing military clothing, which marks him as indubitably masculine.

Yet—and it is hard to convey the force of this in 1950s America—he had a beard. And not just a small goatee, like an Italian count or a beatnik painter in the movies, but a thick untrimmed mass, worn as an explicit pledge of faith rather than a stylistic gesture: to abjure shaving until Batista was overthrown. Nor did he take this pledge alone. Many in the Rebel Army were much more unkempt than Fidel, who at least kept his hair short. Particularly notable was his brother Raul, whose "girlish" locks were singled out, even by sympathetic journalists, while some of the earliest anti-*fidelistas* made an explicit comparison between Raul's supposed effeminacy and his vicious attraction to communism.[26]

Here one is forcibly reminded of the negative weight attached to excessive hair of any kind in the Cold War years, if not by national-security managers then by politicians and the adult world. Senator Barry Goldwater summed up the popular view when he remarked after the revolutionary victory that Castro "came over the hills looking like a knight in shining armor, and turned out to be a bum without a shave."[27] Yet there can be little doubt that the sheer hairiness of Castro and his *barbudos* endeared them to North American youth, indelibly associating the Revolution with a generationally inspired insouciance and defiance of convention. A powerfully supportive factor was the constant association of Castro with large cigars—stuck in his mouth, waved in the air, smoked even in combat—a progenitive image that requires no unpacking.

What does need underlining here is that the shabby, hairy Cuban rebels in their cast-off uniforms were quite clearly the polar opposite of the "rebels without a cause," the hipsters and Beats who proclaimed their distaste for politics along with everything else that was organized. The *fidelista* version of hipsterism was something else entirely, not strung out but clued all the way in, so alienated from a corrupt society as to demand an entirely New Man in a new, revolutionary, and liberated nation. The combination of virulent idealism, high-minded bloodthirstiness, and an utter disregard for standards of hygiene and grooming was a potent one. Indeed, to have these wild men also spout Montesquieu, Paine, and FDR at the drop of the hat, while talking about a grisly martyrdom at the hands of Batista's killers as if it were an honor, was almost too much of a good thing. As Barbara Ehrenreich has pointed out, in the fifties Hugh Hefner rhapsodized about living well, even

sybaritically, in a world without women other than "chicks." Castro offered the perfect obverse—a vision of living hard and dying well, also in a world without women (other than the nunlike middle-class girls who occasionally cropped up in press coverage of the Rebel Army).[28]

In sum, Castro was "The Outsider," as Colin Wilson would famously put it in a book published the same year as the *Granma*'s landing, like so many culture heroes of the fifties. Yet unlike Elvis or Kerouac or Dean, white boys acting out rebellion on screen, in print, on disc, and through a vastly public private life, Castro was both an actual rebel in the traditional, paramilitary sense—someone who had taken up arms against an established government—and also oddly upstanding, a lawyer and a man of parts who earned a bemused respect from the most respectable of North Americans. How did he pull it off? The final key to understanding the strange breadth of Castro's popularity in the United States lies in his status as a White Man in a Dark Land.

The Rebel as Aristocrat

At the core of Fidel Castro's appeal was the ambiguous racial status assigned to men like him in white North American popular culture. Behind the stirring, sometimes mocking images of Fidel (one young freelancer returned from Cuba called him "a combination Robin Hood, George Washington and Gregory Peck") lay a whole set of racially coded images that drew on North Americans' convoluted thinking about the lands and peoples to their south.[29]

Most obviously, the always implicit questions for most Yankees in dealing with Latin Americans were: Are they white? Which of them is white? And of those who consider themselves white, and whom we accept provisionally as white, how truly white are they? What about the rest—how unwhite are they? Are they like blacks or Indians or something else for which we as yet have no name?

Where did Castro fit in this familiar story? Under the right circumstances, he could be seen as a knight errant transported from Old Spain, fulfilling the familiar part of the aristocratic rebel who overturns locally corrupt authorities at the head of poor but honest peasants (the popular *Zorro* television series was only the latest version of this narrative). Another version of the common story cast him as a much more ambiguous figure, a half-caste bastard aristocrat or "Creole" of uncertain parentage—this was rather closer to the truth, but harder to sell. Both of these were highly fraught

personae, but the very confusion between them appealed to the long-standing Yankee fascination with the Latin concept of *mestizaje*, or race-mixing, which defied North America's "one-drop" racial definitions.[30]

Framed by this larger context, the question asked and answered (if only indirectly) about Fidel Castro and his guerrillas is clear. For the U.S. audience, they were treated en masse as fitting into that category of vagueness that, for lack of a better word, we can call "Latin"—meaning something in between, where blanket judgments were suspended, and class and caste were gingerly read into any given social setting without much local assistance.

On occasion, this ambiguity was resolved by an explicit signaling that Fidel himself was white, as Matthews did when he told his readers in that first scoop that Castro's father was an emigrant from Spain, a "Gallego" or Galician like Francisco Franco. But most of the time, U.S. audiences were left to draw their own conclusions. Ultimately, what mattered was not what was said or shown, but the opposite—the omission of any discussion of the racial character of the Rebel Army, let alone the larger context of Cuba's complex politics of color. To put it plainly, there were few if any black faces in this diorama.

Indeed, one could read all of the U.S. coverage of the Cuban guerrilla war in the late fifties and come away with no knowledge at all that very many, even a majority, of Cubans share African ancestry. Only occasional references to Batista's multiracial parentage, and how black Cubans reputedly supported him out of some generalized ethnic solidarity, slipped through this filter.

It would be too easy to indict the Yankee version of *fidelismo* as simply racist, hailing Castro because he was white. In reality, there were more than enough reasons to admire Castro, including the fact that he worked hard to attract North American support. His ambiguous racial status, and his seeming familiarity as a "Spanish" type (the fallen grandee, the matador), were just additional passports to North America. What one can say is that his appeal drew on the long tradition of admiration for semi- or not-quite-white (but never black) heroes, a way of talking about race (and flirting with racial difference) without confronting it. In these situations, a lot depended on how a man looked, plainly enough. So too with Fidel.

Yet North Americans were not so ignorant of Cuba as to think of Castro's followers as simply the equivalent of Spanish, Greek, or Italian "poor whites." Mexicans, Cubans, and other Latins have never been accorded even that lowly status. Castro may have been seen as provisionally white,

but not the Cubans as a whole, which is perhaps the most important point to make about the racial politics of North American solidarity: his status was enhanced, not reduced, by his apparent color-blindness, his Robin Hood–like egalitarianism among the *campesinos* of the Sierra Maestra.

Here one uncovers the hidden dynamics of liberal attitudes toward the third world, and the presumed lesson for America. Just as Dixiecrat-style bigotry at home undermined the United States' democratic mission in the Free World, so did narratives of enlightened attitudes elsewhere show the way for right-thinking whites here. Unfortunately for Hollywood, by the 1950s it was impossible to portray in a positive light the British, French, Belgians, or Afrikaners fighting to hold on to imperial privilege premised on the "color bar" in Africa and Asia. There are very few films about the long-running colonial struggles of the fifties, no *Gunga Din* or *Lives of a Bengal Lancer* to stir young imaginations.

In this context, Latin America was an unexpected refuge. Here were men not so different from white Americans (or at least much more "like" them than Ho Chi Minh, Patrice Lumumba, or Kwame Nkrumah), who actually fought to overthrow established privilege, and fought alongside those who were clearly marked as their racial inferiors.

None of this explanation should be construed as suggesting that the U.S. fascination with Castro in the late fifties was manipulated, or insincere in any way. It simply bears repeating that if Fidel had been evidently Afro-Cuban, as so many Cubans are, the character of that solidarity would have been very different, and perhaps much more explicitly radical. In this sense, then, it seems fair to cast Castro as the White Guerrilla, a true-to-life analogue of Norman Mailer's famous White Negro—a man who had thrown it all away, and chosen to live dangerously so as to truly live, "a frontiersman in the Wild West of American night life."[31]

The Romance Wears Off: Blacking Up Fidel

One can write about the 1957–58 period as essentially one sustained moment because the character of North American solidarity was constant throughout, waxing and waning only slightly as Castro seemed to advance or recede. The 26th of July's adherents in New York, Florida, and elsewhere picketed, sang, raised money, and tried to pick up guns wherever they could, concocting fantastic schemes to transfer them to Cuba in the manner of their nineteenth-century forebears. Journalists went to the island and wrote about the tropical carnage in breathless prose emulating Matthews. Young

gringos of various sorts also went to Cuba (or tried to), modeling themselves upon William Morgan, the three teenagers from Guantánamo, and perhaps Gary Cooper in *For Whom the Bell Tolls.*

In this sense, the "Cuba Story" (as Herbert Matthews called it in a book of that name published in 1960) fully fit the literary model of a romance, in the crassest sense. It entertained and thrilled, and it went on forever; one could always buy another version of the same story. Of course, Fidel's brushes with near-death in the face of Batista's seemingly overwhelming force were heartstopping, and of course readers wanted Fidel to win, but much or most of the excitement depended upon his continuing fight against great odds. Robin Hood must stay in the forest with his Merry Men to assure us that there is always a place to which we can retreat, and from which justice may providentially be summoned forth, not through our own efforts but through the intervention of another.

What changed after Batista's dramatic flight in the early hours of January 1, 1959, as Castro's guerrilla columns closed in on Havana? For a few days, a week perhaps, Fidel was the man of the hour, of the hemisphere. *Life* hailed him as a "liberator," and all of the United States seemed to revel in his victory. Then came the executions of several hundred *batistiano* secret policemen, after public revolutionary trials that inevitably inspired comparisons with the French and Russian Terrors. By the end of January, a chorus of outrage could be heard in the U.S. Congress, even though Castro still merited a pajama-clad appearance live from the Havana Hilton on Edward R. Murrow's celebrity-interview program, *In Person.*

The early months of 1959 continued in this fashion, as a sort of minuet between the North American public's obvious fascination with Castro and his uncontrollable appetite for unseemly radicalism. Clearly, the question was: is he on "our" side or not? The Eisenhower administration, which had only woken up to the reality of a Castro-led revolution too late to stop it, clearly thought not, but it was unseemly to announce this as a bald fact when Castro had been publicly declared a "good guy" by the media, and much else.[32]

Interestingly enough, Fidel seemed well aware that his glow was fading. While committed to a revolutionary transformation of Cuban society, and prepared to do whatever was needed to carry it out, whether a quiet rapprochement with the Cuban Communists in 1959 or later an alliance with the Soviet Union, he still believed in the possibility of convincing the North Americans. His trip to the United States in April 1959 was an "Indian Summer," in all possible senses of that term. Not only were crowds in the streets

beguiled, but one Republican Congressman described himself, after meeting Fidel, as a "nuevo amigo," and an awestruck *New York Times* reporter described Castro's presence in Washington as "out of another century—the century of Sam Adams and Patrick Henry and Tom Paine and Thomas Jefferson"—he had "stirred memories, long dimmed, of a revolutionary past."[33]

Castro's ability to overcome doubts through personal campaigning was never more on display, but its effects were short-lived. No matter how convincing his insistence that the Cuban Revolution was *"humanista, no comunista"* (as the Revolutionary Government stamped on mail between the island and the United States during 1959), the Agrarian Reform announced in May 1959 had serious implications for U.S. property holders, and ultimately for the North American position in Latin America. As Castro's popularity receded in the United States during 1959, the language used to describe him changed too. What was formerly seen as a virile outspokenness and dynamism was recast in terms with a distinct racial aura. The use of words like "ranting" and "demagogue" seemed to invoke both Mussolini and darker images, as if he were a Marcus Garvey brought to power, an Emperor Jim brought to life. In *Life's* view, he had become "the silly egomaniac who runs Cuba . . . just another tinhorn tyrant."[34]

Meanwhile, new constituencies came to the fore within the United States. Castro's victory rapidly attracted the interest of African Americans, who hitherto had paid little attention to Cuba. Black journalists flew to Cuba and reported rhapsodically on the new government even as the white press began decrying its policy of publicly shooting proven killers from the former regime.[35] At Christmas 1959, seventy five African Americans, including various newspaper publishers and Joe Louis, joined a Cuban-sponsored delegation to Havana. Most interestingly, during this period, many in Black America began to see Fidel in a different light. The dissident NAACP leader Robert F. Williams, who had begun practicing armed self-defense in Monroe, North Carolina, wrote in his mimeographed newsletter *The Crusader* that "Castro and all other colored rulers will do well to shun bigoted Uncle Sam's smiling false face and his racial claims of bondage."[36]

In early 1960, stray journalists, honest liberals, and Beat intellectuals would form the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, beginning another chapter of solidarity with the Cuban Revolution. They would rapidly draw in various strands of the Old-into-New Lefts, and after a year of considerable popularity on campuses, suffer an ignominious obscurity that persists to this day.

But behind Fair Play for Cuba, and all the other tangled narratives of the

family feud between Cuba and Uncle Sam, lies the furious, unconsummated courtship of 1957–58. Until Nelson Mandela at the very end of the Cold War, Castro was the only third world leader ever to walk through cheering crowds down America's mean streets, the only one to lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, the only one for whom American boys fought and died as willing, publicly acknowledged recruits. That this engagement took place not at the height of the sixties but earlier, when the certainty of American life seemed to stretch to the horizon and beyond, only indicates how volatile and fecund was the culture of Cold War America, even at its presumed political nadir.

From Black Power to Civil Rights
Julian Mayfield and African American Expatriates in Nkrumah's Ghana, 1957–1966

KEVIN GAINES

DURING THE OFFICIAL FESTIVITIES marking Ghana's independence in 1957, the head of the U.S. delegation, Vice President Richard Nixon, reportedly asked several bystanders, "How does it feel to be free," only to be taken aback at their response: "We wouldn't know. We're from Alabama."[1] That incident captures both the bittersweet meaning of the occasion for African Americans, and its transformative potential for African American consciousness. At the height of the civil rights movement, from the late 1950s to 1966, hundreds of African Americans, including intellectuals, technicians, teachers, artists, and trade unionists, left the United States for Ghana, the first sub-Saharan African nation to gain its independence from colonial rule.

This extraordinary migration was hardly accidental. Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first president, had studied in the United States during the 1930s. Nkrumah extended the hand of Pan-African solidarity to black Americans, including W.E.B. Du Bois, who spent his last years as a citizen of Ghana. Ghana was a magnet for African Americans whose support for Nkrumah's politics of nonalignment, African continental unity, and revolutionary Pan-Africanism was reinforced by their frustration at the racial inequities and Cold War constraints of U.S. society.[2] The overthrow of Nkrumah in a military coup and his death in exile in Guinea in 1972 marked the demise of Ghana's leadership of struggles for economic and political independence for African peoples. The fall of Nkrumah's government in February of 1966 occasioned the dispersal of most of the expatriates, whose ties to Nkrumah made them suspect in the eyes of the new regime.

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of Illinois Press, 1993), 216. Isserman's study is more attentive to continuities within the Left than other works on the topic. Allen W. Dulles to Leo Cherne, May 9, 1953, Box 56, Allen W. Dulles Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University; for the IRC's role in Operation Brotherhood see Leo Cherne to Wesley Fishel, April 17, 1955, UA 1269, Box 7, Fishel Papers; Chester, *Covert Network*, 153–54; see also Cecil B. Currey, *Edward Lansdale, the Unquiet American* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988) 159, 165, 342.

43. Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 100–101.
44. Joseph Buttinger, "Fact and Fiction on Foreign Aid," *Dissent* 6 (Summer 1959): 316–67; for the tributes of Foreign Service personnel to Buttinger, see C. Alphonso Smith to Joseph Buttinger, July 17, 1959, Loy W. Henderson to Joseph Buttinger, June 29, 1959, and Elbridge Durbrow to Joseph Buttinger, July 1, 1959, Box 9, Joseph Buttinger Papers, Harvard-Yenching Library.
45. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), 516–17; Godfrey Hodgson, *America in Our Time* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976), 95.
46. Morgan, *The Vietnam Lobby*, 159; McGreevy, "Thinking on One's Own," 118.
47. Lansdale quoted in Currey, *Edward Lansdale*, 165; Geist, *Pictures Will Talk*, 275.
48. For Dooley see James T. Fisher, *Dr. America: The Lives of Thomas A. Dooley, 1927–1961* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997).
49. Edward G. Lansdale to Maj. Gen. John W. O'Daniel (ret.), August 5, 1963, Box 39, Edward G. Lansdale Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Palo Alto, California.
50. Esther Pike to Angier Biddle Duke, March 24, 1958, Box 12, AFV Papers, Lubbock; Draft letter, Angier Biddle Duke to Esther Pike, April 23, 1958, Box 12, AFV Papers, Lubbock.
51. Timothy J. Sarbaugh, "'No Catholic in the White House': John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the Catholic Vote, and Presidential Politics, 1959–1960," unpublished manuscript, 34.
52. Sen. John F. Kennedy, "America's Stake in Vietnam," in *A Symposium on America's Stake in Vietnam* (New York: HarperCollins, 1956), 8–14.
53. Gerald S. and Deborah H. Strober, *"Let Us Begin Anew": An Oral History of the Kennedy Presidency* (New York: 1993), 419; Ellen J. Hammer, *A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963* (New York: 1987), 300–301.

Fidel Castro and the White Guerrilla

1. *New York Times*, February 24, 1957, 1. This is the lead sentence in the top left hand, front page article, next to a grainy closeup of Matthews and Castro conferring together on a hillside. Castro had landed in Cuba with a small force in early December 1956 and had come under immediate attack by the army of the dictator Fulgencio Batista. The Cuban government's claim that it had killed Castro was widely reported, so much so that Matthews' proof of his existence caused a great sensation, with thousands of reprints smuggled into the island by pro-Castro exiles.

2. It draws mainly upon Van Gosse, *Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New Left* (New York: Verso, 1993), incorporating some additional perspectives.
3. A key text here is Richard Harding Davis, *Cuba in War Time* (1897), with its Remington drawings of a picturesque Cuban *jacquerie*, brutal Spanish officers, and heroic *insurgentes* facing the firing squad as sweethearts and parents look on.
4. Since the late sixties, an explicitly oppositional anti-imperialist "solidarity" has revived on the Left, but this was an adaptation of socialist internationalism in concert with a radicalized Christianity. These activists look to Cuba, but it is the post-1961, socialist Cuba they see, the beacon of an intransigent third world liberation. A mass response to Castro and his guerrillas outside of, and prior to, an organized "New Left" politics is received by most activists (and activist scholars) as something archaic and quaint, a relic of the fifties. I would argue that this demonstrates the narrow premises of most left-wing thinking about political dissent in the United States, and an unwillingness to recognize continuities and affinities with conventional politics and common passions.
5. Reprinted in George Black, *The Good Neighbor: How the United States Wrote the History of Central America and the Caribbean* (New York: Pantheon, 1988), 105. See also William E. Ratliff, ed., *The Selling of Fidel Castro: The Media and the Cuban Revolution* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1987).
6. *Time*, October 28, 1957; *Life*, April 14 and July 14, 1958; *Time*, July 14, 1958. Carlos Franqui, *Family Portrait with Fidel* (New York: Random House, 1964), 11.
7. Interview with Alan Sagner, June 25, 1990.
8. Jules R. Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of Liberty in an Age of National Liberation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 137.
9. Stewart Alsop, "The Fruits of Castro's Plotting," *Saturday Evening Post*, March 16, 1963, 75–76.
10. See Joseph G. Morgan, *The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955–1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).
11. John F. Kennedy, *The Strategy for Peace*, ed. Allan Nevins (New York: Popular Library, 1961), 167–68; Kevin Tierney, "American-Cuban Relations, 1957–1963" (Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1979), 133.
12. See Gosse, *Where the Boys Are*, 23–24, 48–49, 77–79. On the split within the U.S. embassy, see Hugh Thomas, *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 964–67; Mario Lazo, *Dagger in the Heart: American Policy Failures in Cuba* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), 139–40, 233–35; Morris Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 66–71; plus correspondence in the Herbert L. Matthews Papers at Butler Library, Columbia University, concerning different foreign service officers.
13. Jules Dubois, *Fidel Castro: Rebel—Liberator or Dictator?* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959). The first printing was in March 1959, with a second in April.
14. See Gosse, *Where the Boys Are*, 71–75 for an extended discussion of Matthews's role.

15. The only available polling data is from May 1959, when there had been months of negative news coverage: by that time 88 percent of those asked knew Castro, and 31 percent regarded him favorably (*New York Times,* May 18, 1959).
16. Neill Macaulay, *A Rebel in Cuba* (New York: Quadrangle, 1970), 13, where Macaulay meets a new acquaintance just returned from fighting in Cuba at the 26th of July's Manhattan headquarters: "Soldini said he could tell I was a guy just like him—a guy who liked a good fire-fight"; *New York Times,* September 6, 1959.
17. See *New York Times,* April 4, 1958, for Morgan's statement "Why I Am Here" and photos.
18. Interview with Donald Soldini, June 3, 1992.
19. For an adulatory account of Fiorini/Sturgis as gunrunner and combatant, see *Chicago Sun-Times'* correspondent Ray Brennan's *Castro, Cuba and Justice* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), 189 *passim.*
20. Richard Slotkin, "Gunfighters and Green Berets: *The Magnificent Seven* and the Myth of Counter-Insurgency," *Radical History Review* 44 (April 1989): 75.
21. See James T. Fisher, *Dr. America: The Lives of Thomas A. Dooley, 1927–1961* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997).
22. Lloyd Gardner, *Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995).
23. Allen Woll, *The Latin Image in American Film,* revised edition (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin America Center Publications, 1980).
24. Doubtless, one could argue about the particular effect of any of these cultural productions, and cite all of the young whites who continued to buy Patti Page records and signed pledges to abstain from rock 'n' roll as they would from premarital petting.
25. *Time,* April 14, 1958; letter from Yale Political Union President to Herbert L. Matthews, November 12, 1958, asking him to moderate the debate, and letter from Hank di Suvero to Matthews, March 9, 1957, both in Herbert L. Matthews Papers, Butler Library, Columbia University.
26. See Nathaniel Weyl, *Red Star over Cuba: The Russian Assault on the Western Hemisphere* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1960).
27. Quoted in an editorial in the New York *Daily News,* September 21, 1960, while Castro was visiting the city and causing an enormous furor.
28. Barbara Ehrenreich, *The Hearts of Men: American Dreams and the Flight from Commitment* (New York: Anchor/Doubleday, 1983). That the Rebel Army as a homosocial space was part of its (and Castro's) gender-specific attraction should not be too surprising. As Tom Engelhardt emphasizes in *The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), men and boys at this point in U.S. history were deeply absorbed in a variety of war stories. Too little work has been done to date on what dreams and images preoccupied young women and girls, though it seems clear that they were quite different. Both Sara Evans, *Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left* (New York: Vintage, 1979), and, in a very different way, the chapters by Marjorie Melville in Thomas and Marjorie Melville, *Whose Heaven? Whose Earth?* (New York: Knopf, 1971) are useful here in describing the faith-based inclination toward self-sacrifice and self-abnegation among middle-class white women (Marjorie Melville entered the Maryknoll order of missionaries in the early 1960s and was sent to Guatemala, where she became close to the revolutionary movement and was expelled in 1967).
29. *New Leader,* September 30, 1957.
30. For extended discussions of North American interest in how race operated differently in Latin America, see Fredrick B. Pike, *The United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of Nature and Civilization* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992).
31. Norman Mailer, "The White Negro," reprinted in Gene Feldman and Max Gartenberg, eds., *The Beat Generation and the Angry Young Men* (Secaucus, N.J.: Citadel Press, 1958, 1984), 344.
32. For accounts of U.S. diplomatic policy toward Castro before and after January 1, 1959, see Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution,* and Wayne S. Smith, *The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since 1957* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987).
33. *New York Times,* April 18 and 20, 1959.
34. *Life,* November 16, 1959.
35. See "The African American Press Greets the Cuban Revolution," in Lisa Brock and Digna Castaneda Fuertes, eds., *Between Race and Empire: African Americans and Cubans Before the Cuban Revolution* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998).
36. *The Crusader,* November 28, 1959.

Julian Mayfield and African American Expatriates

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1. Nixon's gaffe is recounted in David Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 133, and in Erica Powell, *Private Secretary (Female)/Gold Coast* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).
2. Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology* (New York: Praeger, 1962).
3. This idealized view is to be distinguished from Bayard Rustin's formulation "From Civil Rights to Black Power," which was an apt description of the new character and location of activism. Struggles against racial segregation in the South had given way to campaigns for economic democracy in northern ghettoes.
4. Gary Gerstle, "Race and the Myth of Liberal Consensus," *Journal of American History* 82, no. 2 (September 1995):579–86; Thomas Sugrue, "Crabgrass-Roots Politics: Race, Rights, and the Reaction against Liberalism in the Urban North,